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Abstract A threshold scheme, which is introduced by Shamir in 1979,
is very famous as a secret sharing scheme. Dealer distribute shares of a
secret value among $n$ participants. Gathering $t(\leq n)$ participants, a se-
cret value can be reconstructed. This is called $a(t, n)$ secret sharing
scheme. This scheme is based on Lagrange's interpolation formula. As
regard interpolation formula, it is known not only Lagrange's interpola-
tion but also Hermite interpolation. In this paper, we give a scheme of
a secret sharing scheme based on Hermite interpolation, in case of two
secret values.
1. Introduction
A secret sharing scheme was introduced by Shamir in 1979 [6] and
Blakley in 1979 [2] independently. A secret sharing scheme has been
studied by many scientists until today. Now, a secret sharing scheme has
some important application to several areas of the information security.
In Japan, NRI (Nomura Research Institute) Secure Technologies which
is one of the private sector in the area of the information security, has
provided clients with some cloud computing product named Secure Cube,
from October in 2010. This cloud computing product is utilized by a
secret sharing scheme, and is one good example of the application to an
external storage unit.
The secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute shares of a secret
value { we call it a key, too { $K$ among a set of participants $P$ such
a way that only the qualied subsets of $P$ are able to reconstruct the
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value of $K$ from their shares. In 1979, Shamir [6] introduced the secret
sharing scheme which was based Lagrange's interpolation formula. This
scheme is called Shamir's threshold scheme. In 1987, Feldman [3] studied
a veriable scheme in distributing system. In 1992, Pedersen [5] applied
a veriable secret sharing scheme to Shamir's threshold scheme.
A secret sharing scheme has one key $K$ . On the other hand, a multi-
secret sharing scheme has more than one key. Dealer distribute shares of
keys among $n$ participants. Let a set of participants $P=\{P_{1}, P_{2}, \cdots, P_{n}\}.$
Gathering $t(\leq n)$ participants, keys can be reconstructed. A multi-secret
sharing scheme based on Lagrange's interpolation is studied by Yang et.
al. [7] in 2004, and by Pang and Wang [4] in 2005. In 2004, we give a
scheme of $a(t, n)$ secret sharing scheme based on Hermite interpolation
[1].
In this paper, especially, we give a scheme of a secret sharing scheme
with two keys based on Hermite interpolation. Moreover, we compare
computational complexity of our scheme and that of Yang et. al. $s$
scheme.
2. Lagrange's interpolation and Hermite interpolation
In this section, we describe two famous interpolation formula, that is,
Lagrange's interpolation and Hermite interpolation. In numerical anal-
ysis, Lagrange's interpolation and Hermite interpolation is a method of
interpolating data points as a polynomial function.
2.1 Lagrange's interpolation
Suppose that a function $f(x)$ is dened on a closed interval $[a, b].$
Given $n+1$ data points $x_{0},$ $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $x_{n},$ $(a\leq x_{i}\leq b,$ $x_{i}\neq x_{j}$ for
$i\neq j)$ , and values
$f_{k}=f(x_{k}) , k=0, 1, 2, \cdots, n$ , (2.1)
we want to nd an $n$ dimensional polynomial $P(x)$ such that $P(x)$ satis-
es
$P(x_{k})=f_{k}, k=0, 1, 2, \cdots, n$ . (2.2)
We call $P(x)$ , an $n$ dimensional interpolation polynomial for $f(x)$ . In
other words, I want to get an approximation of $f(x)$ , for any variable $x$
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except $n+1$ data points $x_{0},$ $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $x_{n}$ , by calculating the value of
an $n$ dimensional polynomial $P(x)$ .
Here, we can get an $n$ dimensional polynomial $P(x)$ by the following
equation.
$P(x)= \sum_{i=0}^{n}f_{i}\ell_{i}(x)$ (2.3)
where an $n$ dimensional polynomial $\ell_{i}(x)$ satises
$\ell_{i}(x_{k})=\{\begin{array}{l}1 k=i0 k\neq i, k=0, 1, \cdots, n.\end{array}$ (2.4)
Such an $n$ dimensional interpolation polynomial for $f(x)$ which is ex-
pressed by equation (2.3), is called an $n$ dimensional Lagrange's interpo-
lation formula.
An interpolation polynomial can be decided uniquely, but its express
is various. For example, letting
$\ell_{i}(x)=\frac{(x-x_{0}).\cdot.\cdot.\cdot(x-x_{i-1})(x-x_{i+1})\cdot\cdot.\cdot(x-x_{n})}{(x_{i}-x_{0})(x_{i}-x_{i-1})(x_{i}-x_{i+1})\cdot\cdot(x_{i}-x_{n})}$ , (2.5)
it is clear that the $n$ dimensional polynomial $\ell_{i}(x)$ satises equation (2.4).
Hence, we can decide an unique $n$ dimensional polynomial $P(x)$ of equa-
tion (2.3).
2.2 Hermite interpolation
Hermite interpolation is an extension of Lagrange's interpolation.
When using divided dierences to calculate the Hermite polynomial of a
function $f.$
Suppose that a function $f(x)$ is dened on a closed interval $[a, b].$
Given $n+1$ data points $x_{0},$ $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $x_{n},$ $(a\leq x_{i}\leq b,$ $x_{i}\neq x_{j}$ for
$i\neq j)$ , and values
$f_{k}=f(x_{k}) , f_{k}'=f'(x_{k}) , k=0, 1, 2, \cdots, n$ , (2.6)
we want to nd a $2n+1$ dimensional polynomial $P(x)$ such that $P(x)$
satises
$P(x_{k})=f_{k}, P'(x_{k})=f_{k}', k=0, 1, 2, \cdots, n$ . (2.7)
The problem to nd such a polynomial $P(x)$ is called Hermite interpo-
lation.
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Here, it is known that we can get an unique $2n+1$ dimensional
polynomial $P(x)$ by the following equation.
$P(x)= \sum_{i=0}^{n}f_{i}h_{i}(x)+\sum_{i=0}^{n}f_{i}'g_{i}(x)$
where two $2n+1$ dimensional polynomial $h_{i}(x)$ , $g_{i}(x)$ satisfy
$h_{i}(x_{j})=\{\begin{array}{l}1 i=j0i\neq j\end{array}$
$g_{i}(x_{j})=0$ for any $i,j$
and
$h_{i}'(x_{j})=0$ for any $i,j$
$g_{i}'(x_{j})=\{\begin{array}{l}1 i=j0 i\neq j.\end{array}$
This is called Hermite interpolation.
3. A secret sharing scheme with two keys based on Lagrange's
interpolation
In this section, we describe a secret sharing scheme with two keys
based on Lagrange's interpolation. We refer to [7]. We refer to the part
of Yang's scheme in [4], too.
In 2004, Yang et al. [7] introduced a multi-secret sharing scheme.
Since our scheme is treating in the case of two keys, we describe only the
case of two keys in Yang et. al.'s scheme.
(1) System parameters. Let $f(r, s)$ be a two-variable one way func-
tion. Let $q$ be a large prime and all the numbers are element in the
nite eld $GF(q)$ . The trusted dealer randomly selects $n(\geq 2)$ distinct
integers, $s_{1},$ $s_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $s_{n}$ , as secret shadows of participants $P_{1},$ $P_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $P_{n}.$
Here, we use $K_{1},$ $K_{2}$ to denote two keys (secret values).
(2) Secret distribution. Let $t$ be an integer such that $t\geq 2$ . The
secret dealer executes the following steps:
(2a) Construct $a$ $(t-1)$-th degree polynomial $h(x)=K_{1}+K_{2}x+$
$a_{1}x^{2}+a_{2}x^{3}+\cdots+a_{t-2}x^{t-1}$ mod $q$ , where $K_{1},$ $K_{2}$ are two keys and
$a_{1},$ $a_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $a_{t-2}$ are randomly chosen from $GF(q)$ .
(2b) Randomly choose an integer $r$ and compute $y_{i}=h(f(r, s_{i}))$ for
$i=1$ , 2, $\cdots,$ $n.$
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(2c) Publish $(r, y_{1}, y_{2}, \cdots, y_{n})$ in any authenticated manner such as
those in digital signature scheme.
(3) Secret reconstruction. At least $t(2\leq t\leq n)$ participants pool
their pseudo shadows $f(r, s_{i})$ . For example, $t$ participants $P_{1},$ $P_{2},$ $\cdot\cdot$ $\cdot,$ $P_{t}$
pool their pseudo shadows $f(r, s_{1})$ , $f(r, s_{2})$ , $\cdots,$ $f(r, s_{t})$ . By Lagrange's
interpolation polynomial, with the knowledge of $t$ pairs of $(f(r, s_{i}), y_{i})$ ,
the $(t-1)$-th degree polynomial $h(x)$ can be uniquely determined. bom
the obtained polynomial $h(x)$ , we can easily get the $p$ keys $K_{1},$ $K_{2}.$
4. Our scheme : A secret sharing scheme with two keys based
on Hermite interpolation
In this section, we describe our new scheme, that is, $a(t, n)$ secret
sharing scheme with two keys based on Hermite interpolation.
In this scheme, at rst, we prepare system parameters which we need.
Secondly, we describe secret distribution. Finally, we describe secret
reconstruction.
(1) System parameters. Let $f(r, s)$ be a two-variable one way func-
tion. Let $q$ be a large prime and all the numbers are element in the nite
eld $GF(q)$ . The trusted dealer randomly selects $n(\geq 2)$ distinct inte-
gers, $s_{1},$ $s_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $s_{n}$ , as secret shadows of participants $P_{1},$ $P_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $P_{n}$ . The
trusted dealer randomly selects an integer $r$ , calculates $f(r, s_{1})$ , $f(r, s_{2})$ ,
$\ldots,$
$f(r, s_{n})$ .
Here, we use $K_{1},$ $K_{2}$ to denote two keys (secret values).
(2) Secret distribution. Let $t$ be an integer such that $t\geq 2$ . The
secret dealer executes the following steps:
(2a) He constructs $a$ $(t-1)$-th degree polynomial $h(x)$ mod $q$ as fol-
lows, where the two keys $K_{1},$ $K_{2}$ are elements in $GF(q)$ and $a_{1},$ $a_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $a_{t-2}$





(2b) He computes $b_{i}=h(f(r, s_{i}))$ and $d_{i}=h'(f(r, s_{i}))$ for $i=$
$1$ , 2, $\cdots,$ $n.$
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(2c) He publishes $(r, b_{1}, b_{2}, \cdots, b_{n}, d_{1}, d_{2}, \cdots, d_{n})$ in any authenticated
manner such as those in digital signature scheme.
(3) Secret reconstruction. At least $t(2\leq t\leq n)$ participants
execute the following steps:
(3a) They pool their pseudo shadows $f(r, s_{i})$ . For example, $t$ par-
ticipants $P_{1},$ $P_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $P_{t}$ pool their pseudo shadows $f(r, s_{1})$ , $f(r, s_{2})$ , $\cdots,$
$f(r, s_{t})$ .
(3b) They compute $\ell_{i}(x)$ and $d\ell_{i}(x)$ for $i=1$ , 2, 3, $\cdots,$ $t.$
$x-f(r, s_{j})$
$\ell_{i}(x)=\Pi_{j\neq i}f(r, s_{i})-f(r, s_{j})$ mod $q$
$d \ell_{i}(x)=\sum_{j\neq i}\frac{1}{f(r,s_{i})-f(r,s_{j})}$ mod $q$
(3c) They compute $h_{i}(x)$ and $g_{i}(x)$ for $i=1$ , 2, 3, $\cdots,$ $t$ by utilizing
the solution of (3b).
$h_{i}(x)=\ell_{i}(x)^{2}(1-2(x-f(r, s_{i}))d\ell_{i}(x))$ mod $q$
$g_{i}(x)=\ell_{i}(x)^{2}(x-f(r, s_{i}))$ mod $q$
(3d) By Hermite interpolation polynomial, with the knowledge of $t$
triplets of $(f(r, s_{i}), b_{i}, d_{i})$ , the $(2t-1)$-th degree polynomial $h(x)$ mod $q$
can be uniquely determined as follows.
$h(x)= \sum_{i=1}^{t}b_{i}h_{i}(x)+\sum_{i=1}^{t}d_{i}g_{i}(x)$ mod $q$
From the obtained polynomial $h(x)$ mod $q$ , we can easily get the $p$ keys
$K_{1},$ $K_{2}.$
As stated above, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that we have two keys (secrets), $n(\geq 2)$ is
the number of participants, and $t(2\leq t\leq n)$ is the number of necessary
participants who can $recon\mathcal{S}lruct$ two keys (secrets). We can propose a




In this section, we compare computational complexity of our scheme
and that of Yang et. al. $s$ scheme.
As regards phase (1) system parameters, the both schemes have the
same amount of parameters.
As regards phase (2) secret distribution, computational complexity
of our scheme is twice of that of Yang et. al. $s$ scheme. Since, in our
scheme, there are $d_{i}=h'(f(r, s_{i}))$ for $i=1$ , 2, $\cdots,$ $n.$
As regards phase (3) secret reconstruction, computational complexity
of our scheme is twice of that of Yang et. al. $s$ scheme. Since, in (3b)
of our scheme, there are $d\ell_{i}(x)$ for $i=1$ , 2, $\cdots,$ $n$ . In (3c) of our scheme,
there are not only $h_{i}(x)$ but also $g_{i}(x)$ for $i=1$ , 2, $\cdots,$ $n$ . In (3d) of our
scheme, there are not only $\sum_{i=1}^{t}b_{i}h_{i}(x)$ but also $\sum_{i=1}^{t}d_{i}g_{i}(x)$ .
Hence, computational complexity of our scheme is twice of that of
Yang et. al. $s$ scheme. This is suitable, since computational complexity
of Hermite interpolation is twice of that of Lagrange's interpolation.
5. Conclusion
We can propose a new scheme of a secret sharing scheme based on
Hermite interpolation. Hermite interpolation is higher precision analysis
and need more complex computation than Lagrange's interpolation. The
rst merit on our scheme is that we can use distributed shadows with
ne distinctions. The second merit is that we can have higher security,
since its computation is complex for a wiretapper. On the other hand, the
demerit on our scheme is that its computation is complex for participants.
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